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CHAPTER IV

Facilities and Environment

(U) From 1986-91 the Air National Guard (ANG) saw phenomenal growth in its facilities and physical plant. This reflected the expansion in its mission responsibilities and testified to its integration within the Air Force. The two major areas of funding were military construction (MILCON) and real property. MILCON included replacement and rennovation of existing buildings, along with the building of new facilities to accomodate new force structure and equipment. Associated with MILCON, but funded separately, was real property maintenance (RPM). RPM funds were affected by decreases in MILCON appopriations as they were then tapped to accomplish workarounds (alternative solutions to mission accomplishment).

(U) The additions and changes to base real estate came under the category of real property. There were numerous leases renegotiated and property acquired as a result of conversions and/or changes in mission. Base closure also impacted on real property. In some cases the ANG became the major remaining tenant, as at Pease AFB, New Hampshire. In

at least one instance, it became necessary for a unit to change location. The 146th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) left Van Nuys, California when urban congestion and unfavorable lease terms forced the unit to seek a new home.[1]

(U) With the accelerated pace of changes in the ANG, the civil engineering leadership began to see the value of better short and long range planning, particularly in regards to facilities management. Consequently, the Air Directorate initiated base master planning. By 1988, master planning was not an optional activity. Those units who were among the first to complete their plans saw the advantages in terms of flexibility and better facility management. In the case of the 171st Air Refueling Wing (AREFW) and the 112th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), Pennsylvania ANG, the master plan aided the process of aircraft conversion and efficient use of some tricky topography.[2]

(U) Moving into the foreground were the environmental issues that would prove to be the overlay effecting all ANG operations. By CY 1991, the ANG was taking environmental restoration and compliance very seriously. Millions of dollars were being allocated to the first ANG superfund site at Otis ANGB, Massachusetts. Airspace management became another important topic as ANG aircraft fleet modernization forced identification of additional airspace.

(U) The ANG was quick to realize that it was necessary to take a proactive stance in response to federal environmental legislation. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) worked hard to establish good relations with state and local government. An environmental public affairs team was

established to assist units in dealing with adjacent communities. A Risk Communications course, which began in 1990, trained base leadership to effectively answer public concerns over hazardous waste and other threats to the local environment. The major concern for the Air Guard was not the confronting of problems, but the acquisition of funding to pay for their eventual elimination.[3]

(U) This chapter will address the topics of facilities acquisition through additions to MILCON and base real estate; base closure and relocation; master planning; and environmental issues, such as installation restoration, airspace management and compliance with federal regulations.

Facility Acquisition

(U) The ANG Military Construction Program (MILCON) provided the major facility construction to support aircraft conversions, alterations and modernization needed for training and readiness. The MILCON program execution rate varied from 96.4 percent to 100 percent up through FY 1990, with a moratorium imposed on MILCON projects by the Department of Defense (DoD) in January 1990. From FY 1986-89 the ANG exceeded the Office of Secretary of the Defense (OSD) goal of 95 percent.

(U) Major maintenance and repair projects, as well as minor construction projects costing up to $100,000 each were accomplished under the Real Property Maintenance and Repair Program. Expended funds increased from $44.1 million in FY

1986 to almost twice that much in FY 1991.*

(U) MILCON and RPM were affected by expansion in base real estate. Conversions to new aircraft, expansion of commercial airports and the need for new facilities were examples of the factors driving expansion. All changes in real estate had to be approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations). The ANG was usually successful in gaining approval for desired changes with recognition for the Guard's unique relationship to the surrounding civilian community.[4]

(U) One unique development was the establishment in 1988 of the Civil Engineering Technical Services Center.* Located in the City of Minot, North Dakota, the Center functioned as a separate operating location to provide engineering technical support to all ANG bases. It provided assistance teams in the areas of pavement management; asbestos control; corrosion control; heating, ventilation and air conditioning; aircraft arrestment; and in liquid fuel systems. In FY 1991, the Center's teams traveled to 87 different bases, with an overall total of 189 work trips.[5]

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* (U) Execution rates and expended funds per fiscal year were gleaned from the NGB Annual Review issues for FY 1986-90. An important sidenote to the increases in the physical plant was the addition of full-time firefighter positions at all ANG units, who were also able to provide crash rescue protection for flying operations.

* (U) With the transfer of F-15 aircraft to Otis ANGB, Massachusetts, Senator Exon (D-Nebraska) spearheaded the effort to see that the State of North Dakota received over 200 additional postions. The CETSC received 42 of those positions for its operation.

Military Contruction

(U) The growth in military construction budget reflected increases in the ANG. Appropriations for MILCON grew from $29.5 million in FY 1980 to $140 million in FY 1987. The FY 1987 total accomodated 34 projects. There was further growth between FY 1987 and 1991, peaking at $238.3 million for FY 1990. Those increases in MILCON were accompanied by closer OSD and congressional oversight. There was more stringent review of reprogramming packages, elimination of overrun authority for reprogrammed projects, a general lowering of overrun authority to 20 percent (down from 25 percent) and a 30-day congressional notification period added for all minor construction projects over $200,000.

(U) From FY 1985-87, Congress also approved MILCON program budget cuts that diminished the ANG construction capability.* These redirections were originally supposed to be absorbed by utilizing cost savings generated by good bids. However, actual bid prices averaged 102 percent of programmed dollars and that was not possible. Gramm-Rudman reductions of $10.968 million also did not help matters. The

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* (U) FY 1985 - $10 million reduction (7 projects deferred/on hold)
FY 1986 - $13.8 million unspecified reduction (12 projects deferred); $4.3 million unspecified minor construction reduction; $1.9 million reduction based on OMB revised inflation rate adjustment
FY 1987 - $13.6 million OSD cut (2 projects deferred)

result was the deferral of 19 projects (7 for FY 1985 and 12 for FY 1986).[6]

(U) Congressional add-ons also impacted heavily on project execution. Congress authorized and appropriated $40.2 million for the ANG in excess of the President's Budget requests in FY 1984 and 1985. The bulk of the add-on was to support the relocation of the 105th TASG from Westchester, New York, to Stewart Airport, New York, and convert the unit from 0-2 aircraft to Boeing 747s. Prior to the arrival of the first -747, however, the unit was further converted to C-5A aircraft with additional construction identified and funded from Air Force table of allowance.*

(U) The master planning and design effort for that complex (with estimated construction cost of $123 million) placed a heavy drain on the ANG design and construction staff. In FY 1984 and 1985, $39.7 million of congressionally added projects and $7.7 million of Air Force funded projects were authorized for Stewart ANG Base. Of this, $47.4 million authorized and appropriated, only one project valued at $4.1 million was not executed (i.e., a Composite Squadron Operations Facility).[7]

(U) Unforeseen mission requirements also imposed a great strain on planning, programming and execution of the MILCON program. Wholesale acceptance of the Total Force policy by Air Force, coupled with the need to shift and increase some conventional missions into the ANG due to

* (U) Congressional language established Stewart as a joint ANG/USMCR facility and appointed the ANG as the design and construction agent for both the ANG and the USMCR.

active force manning and funding problems, disrupted the long term, ANG Facility program.

(U) Long lead times associated with normal MILCON acquisition were not responsive to mission requirements. This was because minimally designed projects had to be programmed in order to meet initial operational capability (IOC) dates, while intensive management of short fuse projects detracted from total program management. In addition, the rapidly expanding ANG MILCON program overtaxed available manpower. The need for additional design and construction manpower on the ANG staff was recognized early on, but the validation, funding, recruiting and training of additional manpower did not reach fruition until early 1986.

(U) By February, the design and construction staff increased from 8 to 17 personnel, plus three positions were upgraded from GM-13 to GM-14 to better recruit and retain high quality engineers in the Washington, D.C., area. For the field, 11 additional engineer authorizations were obtained to provide additional support at units with heavy MILCON workloads. Also, 14 additional contracting positions were provided to U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFOs)*

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* (U) This was followed in FY 1991 with authorization and funding for 44 temporary technician positions for the USPFO Purchasing and Contracting Divisions, in those states with unusually large Military Construction Program workloads (See Doc **IV-7A**).

Per ANGR 11-02, 15 Oct 87, the USPFOs receive and account for all funds and property of the U.S. in the possession of the National Guard of a specified State, and ensure federal funds are obligated and expended in conformance with applicable statutes and regulations.

to handle increased design and construction activity.[8]

(U) In FY 1987, the ANG MILCON request was increased by $8.9 million as a result of additions of $3.6 million for operations, training, dining and medical facilities at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; $2.5 million for a phase one ramp addition at Martinsburg, West Virginia; $2.2 million for composite facilities at Mitchell Field, Wisconsin; and $0.6 million for multiple facilities at Charleston, West Virginia. The total obligations for FY 1987 were $118.7 million. Over 93 percent of these obligations were devoted to major construction projects.[9]

(U) In FY 1988, the Congress reduced funding for projects at Point Mugu, California ($19.6 million); Stewart IAP, New York, ($2.5 million); and power pad construction at miscellaneous locations ($4.2 million). But, they added funds for projects at Mitchell Field, Wisconsin ($4.5 million); Springfield, Illinois ($4.5 million); St. Louis, Missouri ($4.3 million); Little Rock, Arkansas ($1.7 million); Key Field, Mississippi ($1.4 million); and Jackson, Mississippi ($0.4 million).[10]

(U) Significant add-ons were posted to the ANG MILCON budgets for FY 1989 and FY 1990. However, the construction moratorium placed on the FY 1990 MCP from January - November 1990 placed most projects on hold. The Secretary of Defense replaced that moratorium with a temporary prohibition on military construction effective 15 November 1990 through 16 April 1991. The prohibition did not include design of military construction projects.[11]

(U) The impact of the moratorium on the ANG was serious. It meant that 189 projects valued at over $350 million were not awarded. That broke down to: 12 projects at $12.6 million (FY 1989 and before); 94 projects at $184.3 million (FY 1990); and 83 projects at $160.3 million (FY 1991). According to the NGB, 15 FY 1990 projects, valued at $36.2 million were waived and therefore awarded. While the ANG attempted to get more projects waived from the MILCON prohibition, particularly those ready for bid, they were not very successful.[12]

(U) As to the effect on Real Property Maintenance (RPM), funds allotted to it had to be used to accomplish interim workarounds. The accelerated aircraft conversion schedule did not help. There was real concern at the end of 1990 that those conversions, coupled with the MILCON budget reductions and increasing environmental laws, would result in insufficient RPM funds to maintain ANG facilities. As it was, the average age of the facilities inventory increased to over 35 years.

(U) Fortunately, there was sufficient FY 1990 year end RPM funding to drastically reduce the backlog of design complete projects. The emphasis in CY 1991 was to complete the design of unfunded projects and new FY 1991 projects in case significant year end funds again became available.[13]

(U) The FY 1991 RPM program was budgeted at over $63 million but funded at only $54 million. Urgent requirements remained in the areas of pavements ($30 million); environmental compliance projects ($25 million); leaking

roofs ($20 million); upgrading of antiquated utility systems ($20 million); and health and safety requirements ($10 million).[14]

(U) The moratorium contributed to the significant ANG MILCON backlog reported in CY 1990. With a backlog in excess of $1.1 billion, the engineering staff projected it would take over 20 years to fund some of the projects in the Current Mission category. The staff also pointed out there was 4.2 million square feet of buildings in the Air Guard needing replacement at an estimated cost of $450 million. Many structures dated back to 1945.[15]

(U) As mentioned earlier, congressional add-ons had a negative impact on the execution of MILCON projects. But, the OSD MILCON cuts, in reaction to those add-ons, caused greater concern. While the FY 1992 and FY 1993 MILCON submittals to OSD were the highest ever, during the OSD review of the budget, substantial cuts to the programs were made with no valid justifications. All ANG reclamas were ignored. The OSD cut $80 million in both FY 1992 and FY 1993 based on the fact that Congress had added $114 million to the FY 1991 ANG MILCON program. Previously in FY 1991, the OSD had cut $50 million due to congressional add-ons of $73 million in FY 1990.

(U) Unfortunately, the projects added by Congress were of lower priority. The OSD cuts covered $263 million to be deleted from the FY 1992-93 ANG MILCON budget. Those projects were rolled over to FY 1994. The deletion placed great stress on aircraft conversion efforts.[16]

(U) In testifying before the subcommittee on Military Construction, Brig. Gen. Donald Shepperd described the ANG FY 1992/93 MILCON budgets as:

> The FY 1992 and FY 1993 MILCON budgets before you are not an indication of our immediate facilities requirements. Rather, they are an arranged marriage between curtailed budgets and prioritized critical needs. Many of our facility requirements for aircraft conversions are late to need. We are diverting scarce O & M funds to accomplish temporary workarounds until the MILCON projects are constructed. With reduced budgets we have placed emphasis on support of force structure modernization, environmental compliance and finally, on those few current mission projects with the greatest impact on training and readiness.[17]

(U) Indeed, current mission projects only accounted for 36.9 percent of the FY 1992 MILCON program. By category, support projects came in at the top of major construction projects with an estimated cost of $36.67 million. Environmental projects were the third priority after maintenance at $24.9 million. The total FY 1992 MILCON request came to $131.8 million.[18]

(U) By August 1991, the actual OSD cuts came to 39.7% of the FY 1992 MILCON budget and 93.3% of the FY 1993 budget. Starting in FY 1993, OSD announced they wanted certain RPM projects funded with MILCON monies. There was some question whether Congress would go along with that proposal. All FY 1993 projects supporting aircraft conversions , environmental requirements, elimination of long-standing space deficiencies and health and safety requirements were drastically reduced or pushed into the out years.

(U) The MILCON funds supporting aircraft conversions

continued to flow tardily to ANG units. The eventual impact was seen as 1) aircraft arriving ahead of schedule with no supporting facilities; 2) workarounds identified in Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) reports as one year, staying in place for three years; 3) morale decreasing under austere conditions; and 4) no resources available to change the situation.[19]

Real Property

(U) Between 1986-91, there were many additions to ANG base real estate. Joint-Use agreements were a useful tool in the renewal of leases and in the negotiation for additional land. For the most part, the ANG was able to lease property at a cost considerably below fair market value (FMV). Among the many acquistions that took place, eight stood out:*

(U) In 1989 the 164 Tactical Airlift Group (TAG), Memphis IAP, Tennessee, finalized a land exchange with the airport, so the unit received over 28 acres of land and a lease extension to 2024 in return for giving up 14.73 acres. The 164th gave up buildings which were eventually torn down, but were able to gain a new facility in the process. This proved beneficial to the 164th's conversion to C-141 aircraft, as several new facilities were needed. The first two of seven construction projects began in late CY 1991. One was for ramp expansion and the other for an addition to

* (U) The various examples come primarily from one source; see Parker MFR (U), 6 Aug 92, **SD IV-1**.

the petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) storage area.[**]

(U) Due to the need to expand the ANG Base, home to the 184 Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), 40 acres of land were identified for acquisition at McConnell AFB, Kansas. A congressional add-on of $5.9 million was approved to take care of acquiring the land, along with relocating businesses and homes located there. There was to be enough in the fund for a new operations and testing (O&T) building and a new entrance to the base.

(U) The 185th TFG, at Sioux City, Iowa, acquired 14.77 acres for a composite support facility. Their approach, because of limited space, was to consolidate facilities. Cost to the unit amounted to $550,000. The acquisition was also driven by an aircraft conversion - this time to F-16s. Construction began on the facility in November 1991. This was preceded by ground breaking for a new supply building on 10 October 1991. That freed up space for a new clinic and dining area. Other planned projects included additions to the avionics/weapons release building to accomodate an electronics counter measures building.

(U) The 8,700 square foot additions were to allow weapons training in the same building. The estimated cost of those additions was $336,000, with a completion date of October 1992. The aircraft ramp in front of the 185th's hangar building was rebuilt during the summer of 1991 to

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[**] (U) Also see TSgt Pete Swailes, Unit Historian, "Base Expansion Comes with Mission Change," The River City Flyer, Nov 91, p. 1, **SD IV-18**.

handle the F-16s.[20]

(U) Since 26 June 1990 the Corps of Engineers had attempted to acquire a 15-acre restrictive safety easement facility at Hulman Field, Indiana for the 181st TFG's munitions maintenance and storage complex. They were unsuccessful in negotiating with the landowners, however, since those individuals knew the airport authority had intended to buy land for expansion and did not want their farms encumbered with an easement. The landowners felt any easement would devalue their land.

(U) Since there was no movement to the negotiation, plans were made to acquire the easement by means of condemnation. That had not occurred, however, by the end of 1991.

(U) For several years, the total acreage allotted to the ANG at the Greater Wilmington Airport, Delaware was 57 acres which included 2.943 acres for an headquarters building located one and one-half miles from the 166th TAG's main cantonment area. Beginning in 1985, attempts were made to relocate the headquarters building adjacent to this cantonment area. Finally, the New Castle County Economic Development Corporation agreed to swap 11.4 acres close to the 166th for the 2.9+ acres with the existing building. A new O&T building was programmed to go up on the new land upon finalization of the joint use agreement. The projected date was FY 1994 (third quarter).

(U) As a result of a strong interest on the part of the West Virginia Adjutant General (TAG) and USPFO, along with

the Corps of Engineers, the ANG acquired 32 acres of land near Yeager Airport, Charleston, West Virginia. That property formally housed a gold driving range and was purchased for $606,000. The 130th TAG planned to construct three projects on the land, a composite support complex, security police facility, and base supply warehouse.[21]

(U) For several years, the 114 Air Traffic Control Flight (ATCF) and the 112 Tactical Control Squadron (TCS) had been located on 2.6 acres on the Pennsylvania State University campus. Because the university needed the ANG leased area, they offered the ANG 22 acres at the University Park Airport. Serious discussions began in 1987. The Corps of Engineers began negotiating the nominal cost lease for the new site and pursuing $9.7 million to support the move. The two units hoped to be relocated to their new installation by the FY 1995-96 timeframe.

(U) While most of the aforementioned examples involved additions to existing bases, at the Greater Peoria Airport, Illinois, plans were made to move the entire 182nd Tactical Air Support Group (TASG) to the other side of the airfield. In the first quarter of CY 1985, Maj Gen John B. Conaway and Representative Robert Michel (R, Illinois), announced that there would be a $50 million expansion of the ANG complex. Air Force officials determined that the unit's 33 acre-facility was too small to justify upgrading, so an entirely new facility was slated for construction. A vacant site, on the southeast side of the Greater Peoria Airport, was selected for the expansion. Construction began in 1986.[22]

(U) The new facility had been driven by two

developments in 1984. NGB planners and engineers had become convinced that the cost benefit ratio to rehabilitate the Air Guard base for future modern space age aerial and ground support equipment was questionable. In addition, the Air Force had recalled some ANG unit OA-37 aircraft for sale to South American countries, which suggested a limited potential life span for the tactical support mission. Specifically, four OA-37 aircraft from the 182nd had been delivered to Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Opango AB, El Salvador. That delivery had reduced the 182nd's number of operational aircraft to 18.

(U) These two important and disturbing ingredients spurred local civilian community leaders to take an active role to insure the continued existence of the 182 TASG. High level meetings were scheduled in Washington, D.C. between Peoria civic leaders, the Undersecretary of the Air Force, the Illinois congressional delegation and key Pentagon area directors. Those meetings stimulated interest in assuring the existence of the Peoria ANG unit. After the Greater Peoria Authority Boad of Commissioners and community leaders expressed their concern, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the NGB to explore the issues further. A special NGB team was dispatched to the unit to evaluate existing facilities and examine a 350-acre site offered by the Airport Authority as a possible new location for the 182nd. Upon its return, the team's recommendation led the NGB to begin looking for an architectural/engineering firm which would work on a preliminary feasibility study.[23]

(U) In August 1985, GRW Engineering, Inc. of Lexington, Kentucky, concluded the best option was to build an entire

new facility on the offered acreage across the runway from the then current facility. They cited the small amount of usable property at the existing base, the proximity to a state highway and residential areas, and the lack of ramp space. In their recommendation, GRW Engineering also took into consideration the Airport Authority's plan to extend the runway with corresponding rerouting of a local access road.[24]

(U) In September, the House Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee approved $3.2 million to begin design work. On 26 May 1987, the formal groundbreaking took place. At that time the 182nd announced a projected completion date of CY 1993. During the first half of 1988, much of the drainage and sewer tile was installed. The site preparation phase was complete by early 1989. Two construction firms were awarded contracts for the first four buildings - a composite aircraft maintenance hangar, an avionics/weapons release shop, a composite squadron operations building and an aircraft engine inspection and repair shop. Occupancy was scheduled for July 1990.[25]

(U) Funding for the new facility peaked in FY 1989, though monies were still allocated through FY 1994.* The 1990 MILCON moratorium had some effect on the project, but construction stayed on schedule through 1991. Also,

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* (U) As of December 1989, project status was as follows:

Airfield Pavements/Site Prep Phase II	= 73%
Aircraft Maintenance Hangar	= 44%
Engine I&R/NDI Shop	= 60%
Avionics/Weapons Release Shop	= 60%
Composite Squadron Operations	= 65%

conversion to F-16s caused some additional facilities, specifically, an hush house, an aircraft arresting system, plus two new avionics buildings and munition storage areas.[26]

Base Closures/Relocations

Base Closure

(U) By 1988, while the structure of the U.S. armed forces had changed, the base structure remained unaltered. Therefore, on 3 May 1988 Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, ordering it to conduct an independent study of the domestic military base structure and to recommend installations for realignment and closure. In October 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed, Public Law (PL) 100-256, the "Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act."

(U) Acting on its mandate, the Commission developed a list of bases it recommended for closure. Published in 1989, it received negative reaction from some members of Congress. Affected congressmen leveled three major charges against the Commission process. First, they contended the process had been secretive. In fact, hearings had been closed and information on the ranking of facilities and transcripts of Commission meetings were hard to obtain. Second, Congress noted many of the affected facilities had not been visited by commissioners. Such visits, believed the legislators, might have helped the commissioners verify information included in the staff reports. Finally, they complained that faulty data

had been used to reach the final closure recommendations. Congress believed the General Accounting Office (GAO) or another independent organization should have reviewed the information and data for accuracy. Commission members and legislators also said the panel's mandate to recover the cost within six years was too restrictive and had prevented the closing of several obsolete installations.[27]

(U) The issue was picked up again in 1990, when in an effort to reshape and reduce the military infrastructure, Secretary of Defense Cheney in January proposed closing 36 bases in the United States. The congressional response was reminiscent of the base-closing rounds of the 1960s and 1970s. Congressional critics claimed that the list unfairly targeted districts represented by Democrats. Others charged that Congress again was institutionally incapable of making decisions that were good for the country but painful for some congressional districts. The list was not acted upon by Congress, but the groundwork was laid for a second base-closing commission.[28]

(U) The latter became a reality when on 5 November 1990, President George Bush signed PL 101-510, Title XXIX the "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," establishing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to ensure a timely, independent and fair process for closing and realigning U.S. military installations.

(U) That statute required the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission by 15 April 1991. In accordance with the statute, those recommendations were to be

based upon a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the DoD budget request for FY 1992 and eight selection criteria developed by DoD with public comment. Anticipated levels of defense funding in the FY 1992-97 period and a reassessment of the probable threats to the United States drove the force-structure plan.

(U) The Commission's purpose was to ensure that the proposals submitted by DoD did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the eight selection criteria. Where it identified such deviations, the Commission was authorized to add or delete bases. The Commission's founding legislation called for the process to be repeated in 1993 and 1995.

(U) Based on the Commission's review and analysis and the deliberations process, it recommended to the President that 34 bases be closed and 48 bases be realigned. These actions were to result in FY 1992-97 net savings of $2.3 billion after one-time costs of $4.1 billion. The savings from these actions was to total $1.5 billion annually.[29]

(U) The work of the commissions had a significant impact on the ANG.* Of particular note were three installations that were scheduled to be closed: Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio; Moffett Field, California; and Pease AFB, New Hampshire.

(U) Rickenbacker ANG Base. The DoD recommended closing

* (U) Input on the part of the ANG into the Commission's decision-making was primarily restricted to submission of questionnaires on individual ANG bases.

Rickenbacker ANGB and transfering the 160th Air Refueling Group (AREFG) and an Air Force Reserve unit, the 907th Tactical Airlift Group (TAG), to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. To make room for them, the 4950th Test Wing was to be consolidated with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California.

(U) Since the Air Reserve Components (ARC) units located at Rickenbacker ANGB were the predominant users of the airfield, the Commission noted that support costs for these activities were high and the relocation of the units could bring about significant savings. Transferring the units to Wright-Patterson AFB not only would keep the ANG units in Ohio, but also would reduce the costs to move since the 4950th was to vacate usable facilities. Also, the Commission saw moving the Guard and Reserve units to Dayton as increasing the overall recruiting area population. Plus, colocation with active forces would improve operations since they could share resources.

(U) The local community, the Ohio TAG, the Governor of Ohio and the ANG opposed the closing. The Community leaders questioned the costing methodology and claimed that the costs to move the ARC units were understated. Leaders said that the eight criteria were not consistently applied. In addition, they claimed that moving three more flying units to Dayton would cause air space congestion, and that there would be a negative impact on recruiting.[30]

(U) The inability of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) to handle the transfer of operations and maintenance responsibilities had not strengthened the case for keeping

Rickenbacker ANGB open. By the end of 1990, several issues were still unresolved. They centered around conditions of the 70-year lease of the airfield - specifically the USAF restrictions on the use of the "inside" runway. Only limited use was authorized until completion of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). There also was a requirement for two interim leases pending completion of the Declaration of Excess (DE).* One lease gave 29 acres of apron area to RPA for additional transient aircraft parking, together with a building for Ohio Police Academy training. The other lease placed various sewage facilities under RPA to fulfill their obligation for the sale of sewage services to ANG and the civilian off-base villages and elementary school. These services had been provided by the ANG since the airfield was transfered to the RPA in 1980.

(U) From 1980-91 the RPA had actually been the ANG's tenant, at a cost of $50,000 per year. At the time of the closure announcement, the ANG was set to enter into a joint participation agreement with RPA to construct a $1.3 million three-mile water line to connect the base to city water. The construction project was to begin in April or May 1991, with the federal government share amounting to $200,000. The project, when completed, was to negate the requirement for RPA to sell water services to the ANG and neighboring civilian housing communities as the ANG had been doing.[31]

(U) In its advocacy for keeping ARC units at

* (U) A Declaration of Excess refers to improved or unimproved land which has been deemed unnecessary for military needs. There is an involved approval process for DE recommendations.

Rickenbacker ANGB, the local community prepared a cost estimate for the relocation to Wright-Patterson AFB. However, in deciding for closure, the Commission noted that in preparing the estimate, the community did not recognize that the Air Force was going to use vacated facilities. The Commission further reasoned small additional increases in air traffic would be manageable. In addition, it used the Air Force's recruiting guidelines in determining that locating the units in Dayton did not degrade the recruiting base.

(U) As to the impact on the local economy, government officials determined closing Rickenbacker ANGB would result in a population loss of 13,100 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of 6,700 jobs, and regional income loss of $41 million per year. Those losses were a small portion of a regional population of over 1,071,000, available jobs of 677,000 and an annual regional income of $15.5 billion.

(U) By the end of FY 1997, the net cost of implementing the recommendation was projected at $16 million. Annual savings after implementation was expected to be $22.7 million. The closure date was set for September 1994.

(U) Because there was still strong opposition to moving the ANG units to Wright-Patterson AFB, plans were made to meet with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manpower Reserve Affairs, Installations & Environment (SAF/MI) in early 1992. The Columbus Regional Port Authority was to assume transfer of existent Air Force properties after closure. Their intent was to develop the property commercially, but they voiced a strong interest in keeping the ANG units as tenants.[32]

(U) Moffett Field. In January 1990, the public learned the naval air station (NAS) at Moffett Field was on the list of bases to be closed. The 129 Air Rescue Group (ARG) was one of the units hosted by the NAS. In its closure recommendation, however, the DoD mentioned nothing regarding the 129th. The recommendation was to decommission three active-duty maritime patrol squadrons, and redistribute the remaining squadrons among naval air stations (NAS) at Jacksonville, Florida; Barbers Point, Hawaii; and Brunswick, Maine. The DoD also recommended consolidating the P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at NAS Jacksonville.

(U) The commission reasoned that Moffett Field ranked low among all naval air stations and lowest among the four bases in the maritime patrol aircraft subcategory. The base suffered from severe ground and air space encroachment and there was no potential for increased aircraft operations. Also, Moffett Field was located in a high-cost area. Besides, the force-structure reduction of 25 percent resulted in an excess of one base in the aforementioned subcategory. Moffett Field came up as the candidate for closure.

(U) The community argued that the benefits afforded by Moffett Field were essential to the San Francisco Bay Area economy and to the nation. It cited the long-term coexistence between businesses and the NAS as profitable to the federal government. If the NAS were to close, the community preferred the base should remain federally operated and maintained so that defense contractors could continue to use the air facilities. Moffett Field was seen as a crucial part of the high-technology and aerospace industries.

(U) Though the Base Closure Commission opted to close the NAS, it did agreee that the base should remain in federal custody to support non-DoD agencies and industry. The Commission urged the Secretary of the Air Force to consult with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on its possible use.[33]

(U) In early 1992, NASA stated its position on the reuse of NAS Moffett Field. It noted that NASA should be the host agency with other users, including the 129th ARG, as tenants. That role assumed: a no-cost transfer of ownership of NAS Moffett Field property to NASA; that tenant organizations would be responsible for all costs for out-leased assets and equitable costs for shared assets; that the Navy would retain responsibility for all environmental cleanup; and that NASA would negotiate with the Navy for transfer of essential operational equipment such as navigational aids and fire equipment.[34]

(U) Although transfer to NASA was scheduled for 1997, the Navy planned to accelerate decommissioning of its five patrol squadrons. Therefore, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the DoD and NASA was anticipated in mid-1992. There were several resultant MILCON projects due to the impact of the NAS closure and to support consolidation, itself a result of reuse planning. Approximately $8.6 million was requested to be allocated through the Navy's base closure account for FY 1995 MILCON.

(U) The MILCON projects were designed to replace Navy facilities which would no longer be available due to the

previously stated planning, or which were not suitable for ANG use. Those projects initially included a jet fuel storage complex, an addition to the medical training building, alteration of the vehicle maintenance facility and construction/alteration of a dining facility.

(U) Other unfunded projects were listed in support of the base master reuse plan established by the Moffett Transfer Steering Committee. Those designated as short range were necessary to relocate essential ANG facilities into a contiguous cantonment area. They included a maintenance hangar with shops, antenna farm relocation and alteration of various Navy facilities (avionics, general purpose shops, composite squadron operations, communications). Long range projects included construction of a fuel cell and corrosion control hangar, an engine shop, a small arms range and relocation of vehicle maintenance. The total estimated cost of both long and short range projects equalled $31 million.[35]

(U) Pease AFB. On 29 December 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci recommended the closure of Pease AFB, New Hampshire (the location of the 157th AREFG, New Hampshire ANG). This came as a surprise to base residents. However, the Base Closure Commission noted the shortage of buildings for operations, training and maintenance; the scheduled transfer of FB-111 bombers; and the inadequate launch time for aircraft during international tension and conflict, all contributed to their decision. Since Congress took no action to block the recommendation, the list of closures became law. Therefore, on 18 June 1989, the Secretary of the Air Force officially directed implementation plans to close Pease AFB to begin on 1 January 1990.

(U) Contingent upon transfer of airport operations to civil authorities, the 157th was to remain on the base and continue their strategic integrated operations plan (SIOP) commitment. To facilitate that transfer, the Pease Redevelopment Commission was established on 21 March 1989. The Commission signed a contract with Bechtel Corporation on 1 September 1989 to develop a comprehensive reuse plan, to be completed by June 1990.[36]

(U) Concurrently, the Omaha District of the Army Corps of Engineers assumed overall responsibility for development of the Pease AFB environmental impact statement (EIS). The Corps of Engineers completed a draft of the closure EIS and mailed it to local communities on 21 December 1989. In addition, they were to complete a reuse EIS. The Air Staff did not expect completion of the latter before March 1991. Responsibility for its completion was assigned to the Air Force Regional Civil Engineers at Norton AFB, California.[37]

(U) Fortunately, there was no severe environmental contamination in the 157th cantonment area. However, it took the base seven years (1982-89) to finish the first half of the Installation Restoration Plan (IRP) and the second half was expected to take even longer, because of funds needed for compliance actions. In July 1989 the EPA had placed Pease AFB on the National Priorities List (NPL). It was expected Strategic Air Command (SAC) IRP personnel would be on the base long after closure.[38]

(U) Strategic Air Command and the Air Staff had to resolve several other major closure related issues before

Pease AFB could be shut down. The disposition of the Air Park was a troublesome concern because both money and people were needed to transfer the aircraft. The park consisted of a B-52, B-29, KC-97 and B-47; Whiteman AFB, Missouri, had requested all but the B-47. By 30 September 1990, the B-47 had been transfered to its new home at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. Whiteman AFB contracted for the movement of the remaining three aircraft, but because of the time, money and people required to accomplish the task, the aircraft were not moved until the Fall of 1991.

(U) Another concern involved required maintenance and security of the base when it entered caretaker status. The Air Force Directorate of Programs (AF/PRP) ultimately developed two contracts for that transition period, one for tower operations and the other which encompassed all other base operations.

(U) In addition, SAC understood personnel support for the 157th AREFG would be required following base closure.* Until the 157th reached "stand-alone" capability, the Air Force agreed to provide comand and control, communications, equipment/facility and Presidential support.[39]

(U) The ANG was concerned about the completion of the SAC base civil engineering (BCE) complex (which was about 80 percent complete) before the Air Force left in April 1991. The SAC refused to fund the additional $900,000, so the NGB asked the Air Force to resolve the issue. AF/PRP offered

* (U) As late as September 1992, 11 SAC personnel were still on the base.

base closure operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to finish the complex piecemeal. In that the complex contained a dining hall, a consolidated base personnel office, operations and training, finance and accounting, civil engineering, disaster preparedness and communications, its completion was critical to 157th "stand-alone" status.[40]

(U) Upon redesign of the project and in conjunction with reduced construction costs, SAC changed its position and approved funding for the complex completion. Award of the contract was expected by June 1992, with a projected move-in date of March 1993.

(U) The base closure preceded smoothly through 1991. SAC personnel began leaving Pease AFB in the summer of 1990. By April 1991, 90 percent of the active-duty personnel had left. It was projected that the Pease Development Authority (a state entity) would formally obtain transfer of the airfield, with sponsorship by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in April 1992. As the transition to the local airport authority took place, the ANG expected several MILCON and RPM projects would be necessary to support the unit mission. Total proposed MILCON requirements through FY 1992 came to over $10 million.[41]

Relocations

(U) There were some Air Guard units which changed locations due to reasons other than base closure. Two examples were the 146th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), California ANG and the 104th Tactical Control Squadron (TCS), Oregon ANG.

(U) When the time came to renew the lease at Van Nuys, California Airport for the 146 TAW, the City of Los Angeles was only willing do so at a fair market value (FMV) of $3 million per year. That prompted the 146th to begin looking for a new location. Along with Point Mugu NAS, March AFB, Camarillo Airport, and Norton AFB, all in California, were examined as possible new locations for the unit. Although the U.S. Navy did not embrace the prospect of a move by the ANG to Point Mugu, it made sense from the standpoint of availability of land at a low cost, existent runways and a good recruiting base. By not having to build new runways, the environmental review process was shortened considerably.

(U) In order to allow time for the construction of Channel Islands ANGB, however, the existent lease had to be extended. That was accomplished by a land exchange at Ontario IAP in May 1988. The City of Los Angeles obtained 27.4 acres in return for renewal of the Van Nuys lease at a nominal cost.[42]

(U) The first phase of the relocation involved building of operations facilities and transfer of aircraft to the new Ventura County location. On 28 November 1988, the 146th took possession of the Operations building, Flight Line Maintenance building and half of the aircraft parking ramps at the new base. That was soon followed by the arrival of 16 C-130E aircraft, nine of which operated totally out of Channel Islands. The remainder flew into the Van Nuys airport for scheduled and other needed maintenance and inspections. In January 1989 the 146th held their first split unit training assembly (UTA) between the two bases.[43]

(U) Phase II of the move included all the support facilities and organizations. The move from Van Nuys was completed in May 1990.

(U) In 1987 the ANG began to realize it would not be appropriate for the 104th TCS of the Oregon ANG to remain at North Bend, Oregon. Besides interest by the State of Oregon in using the North Bend ANG Station for a minimum security prison, the Station was becoming expensive to operate. As a result, in 1989 the Station and adjacent water storage site were declared excess due to aging facilities and high operating costs. Fortuitously, the U.S. Navy was vacating its communications facility at Coos Head, on the coast.

(U) The 104th completed relocation to Coos Head, Oregon by March 1988. A 99-year lease was signed with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The unit leaders were very pleased with the relocation, as it provided more room with good expansion possibilities and housed unit members in concrete buildings. There was no change in strength as a result of the move, but the number of personnel was increasing by the end of 1991.

(U) The relocation was complete by March 1988. There was the possibility the 104th would have access to a combined fire station, emergency operations center and ambulance service as the result of an 1.86 acre lease to the Charleston Rural Fire Protection District. However, negotiation on the BLM acreage was not finalized by the end of 1991.[44]

Master Planning

(U) By regulation, specifically AFM 86-14, bases had updated their master plans on an annual basis. In the 1960's this amounted to in-house drawings. Eventually, this did not provide enough information. The ANG Civil Engineering leadership recognized the need to look long range into the future, in order to adequately plan for growth and changes in base facilities. About 1985, the NGB established requirements for detailed master plans, as part of an overall strategy for facilities management.*

(U) The master planning was two-pronged, including both a short and long-term focus. The premise was that no building was sacred and that all configurations were to be considered. The goal was for each base to have 100 acres, though 80-90 acres was acceptable. There were three tiers of structures identified. The first was the cluster of operations, maintenance and shops around the apron. The next tier included supply and fuels buildings. The most outlying tier included administration, engineering and other support facilities.

(U) The master plan methodology dictated an aerial survey of the base to be accomplished first. The staffs then looked at transportation networks, parking and the like, and prioritized projects. A "Summary of Projects" was

* (U) Source: Conversation with Col Larry G. Harrison, Deputy Director, Directorate of Engineering and Services, Air National Guard, 6 October 1992.

accomplished and an architectural style was recommended. Environmental studies were also initiated. Once a selection of the various plans was made, a schedule was worked up with the thought they were not static documents. Flexibility was stressed.

(U) Where an ANG unit was a tenant, sometimes joint master plans were completed (as at Chicago - ANG & AFRES). Or, sometimes the master plan just covered a portion of the base, like at Moffett Field. A new recent enhancement for master planning was CAD, or computer-aided design. Sequential layers of a plan could be superimposed on each other, with elimination of much of the usually needed hand drawing.

(U) Through 1991, about 70 percent of ANG units finished their master plans. The NGB set a goal of 100 percent completion by FY 1994. Plans usually came to a cost of about $200,000 each. Once a unit completed a draft plan, the engineering and services staff at the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) hosted a one to two-day working session. This helped pinpoint problems and develop a more finite long-range plan. A maximum of ten master plans were done per year beginning in 1985. With non-flying units the master plan was simplified. Most of the plan was done in-house based on sample plans provided by the NGB. Units tried to maintain maximum flexibility.[45]

(U) Individual unit master plans each bore their own characteristics while sharing a common methodology. Four sites exemplified the variety of plans, Tucson, Arizona; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Pittsburg, Pennsylvania; and Volk

Field, Wisconsin.

162nd Tactical Fighter Group, Arizona ANG

(U) The 162nd TFG was one of the first ANG units to accomplish a master plan. They were partially motivated by an announced $17.4 million expansion program on 6 February 1985. The expansion was directly linked to the additional tasking to take on F-16 A/B pilot training. This was on top of the A-7 D/K pilot training which the unit then provided.[46]

(U) The 162nd master plan, issued in June 1985, identified four alternative development plans. Two alternatives allowed for apron expansion (to the west or south) and two alternatives opted for moving the apron (to the southeast or both the southeast and southwest).

(U) After considerable review with the NGB and ANGSC, the Arizona ANG decided that alternative number four, moving the apron to a southeast - southwest configuration, would be selected to guide the future development of facilities on the 84-acre site. Especially, since it made about 16 acres of the site available for new buildings that had previously been used only for setbacks or aprons, and eliminated the need for acquiring adjacent private property. In addition, that alternative allowed for twice as much parking and to use land not permitted for building placement. Another plus was the net increase of almost four acres in open space. As a result, a total of nine acres was available for future development.[47]

(U) The first construction project under the announced facilities buildup was a supply warehouse, begun on 10 June 1986. Construction start dates identified under the master plan were generally on schedule as of March 1987. However, the rapid growth in personnel authorizations meant the construction program could not keep up with the increased demand for space. The result was severely crowded facilities in the latter half of CY 1987. A space utilization study was completed in July, but was tabled at the Base Facility Board meeting on 28 August. Managers wanted to review it. It was later accepted in December, with approval for phased implementation.[48]

(U) While the major design concepts of the 1985 Master Plan remained intact, the 162nd updated the plan in December 1987. This became necessary to further clarify the transition bgetween the short and long range plans. An important consideration was the greater distance required between parked F-16 aircraft and adjacent hangars or other buildings. Whereas A-7 aircraft only required 125 feet of setback, the F-16 required 175 feet. One conclusion of the updated plan was that far greater safety and efficiency would result by having the west apron constructed concurrent with the second hush house.[49]

(U) The master plan team, along with the base engineers office, identified three short range and eight long range alternatives to satisfy those respective needs. The adopted short range plan contained four major features.* To begin

* (U) Short and long range alternatives were selected by the Arizona ANG at meetings in November 1987.

with, the fire station was to remain as is. By postponing its replacement, planners hoped for a better location and more efficient facility. Also, the aircraft apron circulation was to be established as one way in and one way out. The third feature stipulated that Perimeter Road was to be moved onto a 30-foot easement on adjacent west property, improving area circulation and parking. Finally, the aircraft ground electronics building was to be moved to west 40, and the existing POL was to remain partially in use, while the security police and telecommunications requirements were postponed to long range.

(U) The major features of the adopted long range plan included creation of an expanded flightline area with a new west apron, hangar, fire station and fighter weapons facility; construction of a new munitions and weapons release facility and relocation of the liquid oxygen storage building (LOX) in the west 40 area; placement of the motor pool and base supply in the old hangar annex and its adjacent aprons; and placement of the dining hall, audio-visual function and disaster preparedness, along with offices for the chaplain, public affairs officer, historian and education and training specialists in the old base supply building.[50]

(U) From 1988-91 the Base Facilities Board used the Master Plan as a base upon which to review RPM projects, track MILCON projects, approve work requests and approve special projects.[51]

137th Tactical Airlift Wing, Oklahoma ANG

(U) In Oklahoma, the 137th TAW discovered the future

basing of C-17 strategic airlift aircraft would pose special challenges. It became apparent in the development of the short and long-range plans for their C-130 aircraft operation that there was not enough existing property to meet the wing's needs, much less the needs for basing Advanced Strategic Airlift Aircraft (ASAA).

(U) Plans were prepared to determine how much property was required to meet existing mission requirements and those of the long-range ASAA. Planners recommended the base civil engineer enter into negotiation with the Oklahoma City Airport Trust for additional land to prevent the needed property from being utilized for some other purpose, thus blocking future expansion of the base. The total land requirement was determined to be approximately 134 acres. This was about 63 acres more than the existent property.[52]

(U) As the master plan, issued in April 1989, was put together, it became obvious that the base layout had to change considerably to accomodate new facilities. Planners noted that the most practical location for the unit's growth was on that land leased from the Oklahoma City Airport Trust or land adjacent to it. They did not seriously consider other locations in the municipal area.[53]

(U) In choosing development alternatives, the planners had to deal with an old Building Restriction Line (BRL) of 750 feet. Normal BRLs were set up 1,000 feet from, and parallel to, the runway centerline. Extending the BRL to 1,000 feet placed four structures within the restriction (hangar, headquarters, hospital and storage buildings). They also had to allow for clear zones at the end of each runway,

prohibiting buildings and apron aircraft parking.

(U) The selected long-range plan included construction of an additional apron on the west side of the base. This, in turn, drove plans to locate the access road with extension to S.W. 54th Street. The new apron was to mean all 24 new aircraft could be parked on the base. Because of the high percentage of development at the Will Rogers ANG Base, various buildings had to be demolished in order for new facilities to be constructed, as with the composite dining and maintenance facilities.

(U) Still, the planners achieved nost of the desired objectives by choosing the sixth alternative as their long-range plan. That plan allowed for aircraft maintenance to be centralized on the west apron; aircraft operations to be grouped around Squadron Operations, with room for expansion; command and support to be grouped together near the main gate; industrial facilities to be grouped together near the service gate, with room for expansion; and military traffic to have their own separate road network without denying aircraft good access to the runways.[54]

(U) Master plan goals were solidified when the ANG acquired 61.5 additional acres in March 1990 through a lease with the airport authority.* This allowed for the move of the combat arms and gas mask training facilities. All along, the 137th did not want to get caught up in becoming land locked, preventing future expansion.

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* (U) This brought total acreage for the 137th up to 132.95 acres.

171st Air Refueling Wing, Pennsylvania ANG

(U) The 171st AREFW completed its master plan early in 1992 and had the particular problem of severe topography to deal with. Continguous with the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport (GPIA), the Air Guard base faced steep slopes within and adjacent to the installation which limited development. The base was built on a graded hilltop surrounded by transitional slopes, with grades up to 25 percent. A series of terraces were constructed to maximize the buildable land. Perhaps the greatest topographical constraint was the deep valley which defined the east edge of the base. The variation in elevation approached 135 feet.[55]

(U) Within the master plan, a short-range plan to accomodate 20 KC-135 aircraft and a long-range plan to accomodate 24 like models were formulated. Both involved expanding apron space, creating aircraft parking space parallel to the runway (14L, 32R). The existing apron was projected to extend 50 feet to the east to allow for sufficient separation between parked and moving aircraft. A new apron was to require acquisition of 73.89 acres of land on the northeast side of base. The resultant two aprons would be divided by the deep valley mentioned earlier.[56]

(U) The needed acreage was acquired from the Allegheny County Department of Aviation in September 1990, increasing total acreage for the base to 179.76 acres. The corresponding new lease was written to expire 31 August 2050. The acquired acreage included an 11.58 acre parcel on the southwest side of base. This parcel, under the master plan,

was to provide room for a new main gatehouse and entrance road.[57]

(U) The 171st was an example where the long-range plan was accelerated because of immediate requirements.

Volk Field, Wisconsin ANG

(U) While most master planning was driven by increases in aircraft inventory, aircraft conversion, or site reconfiguration, Volk Field saw a tremendous increase in its training mission, beginning in 1987. That year the NGB established the ANG's role in Air Base Operability (ABO). As defined in AFR 360-1, ABO was a program designed to provide installation commanders with the capacity to destroy and attack enemy air and ground forces; to limit damage to their respective bases; and to survive, recover and continue to operate under attack or post-attack conditions according to the threat and geographic location. In 1988, Volk Field was chosen as the home of ANG ABO training. In 1990, the NGB designated Volk Field as a Combat Readiness Training Center (CRTC), one of four in the U.S.*

(U) In addition, the NGB installed the Air Combat Maneuvering (ACMI) system at Volk Field in 1991, allowing for year round air and ground tactical training. Its master plan had to take all of the increased training into consideration.[58]

* (U) The other three were located at Savannah, Georgia; Alpena, Michigan; and Gulfport, Mississippi.

(U) In particular, planners had to be responsive to six long-term development goals and mission requirements. They were defined as: expansion of the main aircraft parking apron to accomodate up to three squadrons for simultaneous training operations, and siting of two tactical training areas for a total of five squadrons in composite aircraft operations;** provision of an efficient and functional facility layout for the full-time staff stationed at the base and for scheduled training operations; provision for upgrading of Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities including a fixed radar approach control (RAPCON), surveillance radar (ASR), precision approach radar (PAR), frequency modulation (FM) at base station and automated weather distribution system (AWDS); provision for total force ACMI support for air-to-air and air-to-ground training of combat crews; provision for an ABO training area; and provision for an alternate launch and recovery surface (ALRS).[59]

(U) The selected short-range development plan provided for the construction of facilities to support training at Volk Field. That training was to provide deployed units a site for operational readiness exercises and inspections (ORE/ORI), along with ABO training in a collocated operating base (COB) atmosphere. To support that training, the short-range plan recommended dispersed aircraft parking shelters, taxi tracks, a Rapid Runway Repair and other ABO activity training areas. The plan also advocated increased billets to accomodate between 1,150 and 1,400 personnel.

** (U) A tactical training area was defined as a dispersed aircraft parking area including taxi tracks, simulated aircraft shelters, and associated maintenance and operations facilities.

(U) The selected long-range development plan continued the physical development of Volk Field in support of the many different types of training that occurred at the installation. It included expanded dispersed aircraft parking areas, an expanded aircraft parking ramp, a munitions storage area, billets to accomodate 2,000 personnel and a physical fitness facility. The long-range training goal was for five squadron capability with composite operations, maintenance, dining and support facilities.[60]

(U) The master plan for Volk Field was completed in December 1991, though it was still subject to coordination changes. Airfield, safety and environmental constraints were addressed. Planners noted explosive safety zones needed to be established in the immediate vicinity of several buildings. Also, they noted the potential for soil and ground water contamination at several Installation Restoration Program (IRP) sites. In addition, planners pointed out the existence of threatened or endangered species within a 50-mile radius of the Field.[61]

Environmental Issues

(U) The National Guard Bureau began to seriously address environmental concerns in the late 1980s. This was partially due to growing public attention to past and future damage to the environment. General John B. Conaway testified before Congress in 1991 that:

> As responsible and caring partners of the national community, the Guard will aggressively pursue the

> goal of a cleaner, safer environment for all Americans. We have taken our first steps in order to accomplish this goal, through mandating strict compliance with state and federal laws, to include the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). I have stated publicly that the National Guard of the nineties will pursue the goal of a cleaner environment by identifying and correcting damage resulting from past practices and by establishing preventive procedures and programs to offset future environmental problems.[62]

(U) General Conaway went on to note in FY 1990 that the Guard conducted its first in a series of Executive Environmental Leadership Seminars with over 600 Army and Air Guard senior commanders in attendance. As a result of the seminars, the NGB established a national level Environmental Advisory Council. Perhaps more important were the funds programmed into environmental programs. Over $1 million was obligated for environmental assessment and EIS work associated with 19 aircraft conversions, 10 Special Use Airspace actions, and several real estate investigations. The Bureau issued $1.2 million to ANG units for hazardous waste disposal and analysis costs. The IRP obligated $16 million for survey and clean-up of past practices waste sites.

(U) Other achievements included the establishment of a new Airspace Management Branch, developed to provide long range airspace planning and to work related environmental issues. The ANG also supported the Alaska oil spill clean-up in 1990 by providing over 20 light weight decontamination systems. In addition, ANG units received training regarding the recognition and reporting of hazardous materials, especially those made of asbestos.

(U) General Conaway announced plans for FY 1991 to continue the design of Underground Storage Tank (UST) removal projects, to replace tanks found to be leaking, to remove tanks not required and to continue replacement of all single walled USTs with double walled tanks. A centrally managed contract was to be used to develop Spill Prevention and Response Plans at ten bases. He noted there would be a two-day seminar to present environmental issues to base civil engineers and deputy chiefs of support services and an environmental session at the annual commanders conference.[63]

(U) Brig General Killey, Director of the ANG, echoed General Conaway's concern when he testified:

> We have devoted funding to conduct first-rate environmental impact assessments for aircraft conversions. Hazardous waste disposal analyses and similar environmentally sensitive actions have been taken. Airspace management and long-range planning, installation restoration programs, and underground storage tank removal projects are ongoing.[64]

(U) Basically, the National Guard dealt with environmental concerns in three major areas: cleanup of past contamination; environmental compliance current operations, including the management of natural and cultural resources; and consideration of the environment in planning future activities. In the beginning, the NGB could only estimate the extent of the task before it.

(U) The ANG placed great emphasis on its Installation Restoration Program (IRP), airspace management efforts and relationships with local communities.

Installation Restoration Program

(U) The IRP was a DoD generated program designed to identify and cleanup hazardous waste caused by past disposal practices. Monies to run the program in the ANG were provided directly by DoD within the O&M account, apart from the normal ANG O&M appropriation. Though cursory efforts began in CY 1983, serious attention was given to IRP by CY 1986.

(U) In that year, $1.5 million in Defense Environmental Restoration Appropriation (DERA) funds were provided for conducting Phase I IRP records searches at 66 ANG bases. The ANG scheduled two searches per month until all were completed. Congress also approved over $10 million in DERA funds in FY 1986 for conducting Phase II IRP projects at approximately 20 ANG bases. Those projects ranged from data collection field surveys to cleanup of waste sites.[65]

(U) Part of the reason for the increased attention were the 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA), of which the IRP was the military counterpart. Those amendments demanded two things; first, federal facilities had to conduct all CERCLA activities in accordance with EPA's procedures, processes and regulations; and second, extensive public notification and public involvement programs had to be initiated. These added requirements, though tightening up the restoration process, also lengthened it. The ANG IRP was assigned to the Environmental Divison at the ANG Support Center. A staff of 14 in the IRP branch serviced 130 locations, assisting

environmental coordinators and unit commanders in progressing through the restoration process. There were several phases to IRP, each with its own requirements.[66]

(U) The phases were: Preliminary Assessment (PA); Site Investigation/Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (SI/RI/FS); Research and Development (R&D); Remedial Action (RA); and Removal Action (optional).

(U) In the PA phase, installation files were examined, current and former employees were interviewed and the property and facilities were scrutinized. Additionally, environmental personnel collected all available information on past missions, current operations, waste generation, disposal, environmental receptors and hydrogeology of the area from Guard, as well as public sources. This phase resulted in recommendations for further investigation of potential hazardous waste sites.

(U) The second phase involved examining the extent of contamination, if any, at sites identified in the PA. This was determined by analyses of surface water, groundwater, sediment and soil samples. Investigators often accomplished the SI/RI/FS in steps.

(U) The first step involved sampling and analyses to determine the presence or absence of contaminants, the direction of groundwater flow, potential human receptors and, if possible, to determine if there was a health risk. Personnel had difficulty pre-planning these activities and often worked hard to adequately confirm and quantify the concentration and movement of contaminants. At the

completion of step one, a decision was then made on the need for additional study.

(U) Follow-up steps and subsequent reports were sometimes required to determine the groundwater flow directions and rates of contaminant migration. The intricate steps within the SI/RI/SF were to ensure that the cleanup and containment recommendations made at the conclusion of these activities could resolve the hazards investigators identified. The feasibility study was an examination of different corrective action alternatives that could be performed after investigators fully studied a site. Commanders gave the public an opportunity to provide input into the selection of the final alternative. Once an alternative was selected, a Remedial Action Plan (RAP) designed systems for corrective action and developed engineering specifications prior to initiation of proper remediation.

(U) At sites where the second phase could not identify a suitable available technology to contain or alleviate the contamination, researchers had to develop a new technology. R&D activities also involved the use of new and/or experimental investigative methods to characterize a site.

(U) The fourth phase covered remedial measures required to control identified hazardous releases that could have an adverse impact on public health or the environment. This phase also implemented the RAP which could include construction of containment facilities or cleanup processes, and/or associated long-term monitoring systems.

(U) Removal actions, phase five, were not necessarily associated with an IRP site. Removals were used to abate a threat to public health or the environment. Administrative requirements were less extensive for removal actions, which were generally used in time critical operations.[67]

(U) Throughout the IRP process, in case of immediate need, the IRP branch provided a rapid response team to individual units. Private companies usually took care of normal contaminations and cleanup by way of special contracts from the NGB. There was good cooperation between the ANG Support Center and the field.

(U) Briefings were given to commanders with every field visit. The goal was to keep units out of trouble. DoD money was allocated through the NGB to be spent on individual sites. The IRP branch handled all of the funds except when they related to construction.* The branch expected a $20 million supplemental allocation for FY 1992 and the ANG asked for $120 million for FY 1993. MILCON and other O&M monies were used when necessary.[68]

(U) Although other sites were candidates for future superfund cleanup lists, Otis ANGB, Massachusetts received most of the initial attention. About one-third of the ANG's IRP budget went to Otis. Around $15 million was spent through CY 1991, but that was just a small portion of the eventual $400-500 million projected to be spent to restore that location.

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* (U) The chief of the branch encouraged units to aggressively pursue site cleanup, as he was concerned about future available levels of spending.

(U) In mid-1986, 300 housing units had to convert to town water and get off of individual wells, due to ground water contamination. Nine plumes that extended out from Otis ANGB into the surrounding communities were the conduits of that contamination. Investigators began to look at more than 40 pockets of possible hazardous waste at Otis. Much of the northern Cape Cod area was effected. Approximately 20-25 percent of the ground water in Falmouth, Massachusetts was contaminated by one of the plumes.

(U) The ANG inherited the job of cleanup from several previous occupants, including the Air Force, the U.S. Army and the Coast Guard.* The contamination was not so much the fault of fuel spills, which could be taken care of by natural bacteria action, as it was from 1970s era chemical solvents. The problem at Otis ANGB was exacerbated by the local geology. Because of the high sand content of the soil, the contaminants worked their way easily into the ground water. Additionally, the acquifier was moving at one and one-half feet per day. In other areas, such as Sioux Falls, South Dakota, the acquifier had not moved.[69]

(U) In 1986, the NGB expanded the IRP program to include investigations of potential areas of contamination on other portions of the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR).* The NGB established a Technical Environmental

* (U) The ANG literally inherited an environmental mess and was one reason why the ANG was losing interest in taking over former USAF bases.

* (U) Those areas were Camp Edwards Army National Guard Training Site, the U.S. Coast Guard Air Station at Cape Cod,

Affairs Committee (TEAC) comprised of representatives from the Bureau, the four towns surrounding the base (Mashpee, Sandwich, Bourne and Falmouth), the Barnstable County Health and Environmental Department, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 1986 DEP began to actively review and oversee the expanded IRP program and started to meet with the NGB on a regular basis to evaluate site investigation reports.

(U) In October 1988, the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) took effect and the level of DEP oversight of remedial response actions at the MMR was increased due to more requirements and activities described in the new MCP regulations. In July 1989, EPA proposed the MMR for inclusion on the Federal Superfund National Priorities List. EPS formally added the MMR site to the list on 15 November 1989.[70]

(U) Because of the extent of the cleanup at Otis ANGB and the MMR, an Environmental Management Office (EMO) was initially established at Otis as a pilot program in June 1990 for the ANG nationwide. Due to its success at ensuring environmental compliance, the program began to be implemented at all 91 ANG flying units in the U.S. in October 1991. The EMO consisted of five personnel and was tasked with ensuring compliance with all local, state and federal regulations with regards to the proper handling and disposal of hazardous wastes generated at Otis ANGB. They also monitored projects

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the Cape Cod Air Force Station (PAVE PAWS) and the Veterans Cemetery.

which had environmental considerations such as the waste water treatment plant upgrade project, the underground fuel tank replacement project and the on-base water supply testing program. The EMO personnel were available to remove contaminated liquids and sediments from sump structures on the base. This "remedial action team," consisting of both Air and Army NG personnel, offered a quick and economical cleanup option.[71]

(U) On 20 August 1991, the EMO filed an environmental notification form with the Office of the Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs for the proposed upgrade of the Otis ANGB fuels distribution and storage system. This upgrade was to consist of replacing existing storage and distribution equipment with state of the art equipment which could quickly detect leaks and malfunctions. The project was reviewed by Secretary Susan Tierney pursuant to the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). On 10 October a certificate was issued by the Secretary's executive office, allowing the project to proceed.[72]

(U) As a result of the attention given to the Otis ANGB cleanup, one spinoff was the approval to pay $2.4 million to the towns of Falmouth and Mashpee for water distribution projects. This was on top of the 1986 agreement with the town of Falmouth for installing a municipal water system. The ANG Support Center's environmental division was to distribute the funds. The agreements were signed in November 1991.[73]

(U) Regarding the future of the IRP, there was to be continued direction from the EPA which has identified

hazardous waste sites and prioritized them on a national scale. Their actions were to effect which ANG sites would receive attention first. Besides Otis ANGB, two other locations being scrutinized were at Tucson, Arizona, and Fresno, California. In time, smaller sites were seen as having to compete for fewer dollars. State laws were also to have an impact as environmental problems could receive priority over monies spent on flying operations, e.g. In addition, severe contamination was seen as possibly influencing base closedown, although it has been cheaper to keep bases open and clean them up. Closedown in the past only accelerated cleanup costs.[74]

Airspace Management

(U) With the increasing number of aircraft conversions in the ANG, requiring greater amounts of airspace, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), environmentalists and the general public became more interested in range operations. The FAA's initial reaction was that the ANG already had enough airspace. There was concern about intrusion into previously undisturbed areas; or, as in the case of Buckley ANGB, Colorado, interference with commercial airspace.

(U) The northeast part of the country received particular attention. As missions changed, some states were not sympathetic to serving as airspace for other kinds of aircraft. For example, in Maine, where the 101st Air Refueling Wing had a refueling mission, the public did not see the necessity for having fighters flying over their state. The protest was particularly strong during the

important tourist season. In fact, some leaders saw the day when all fighter aircraft would have to move west of the Mississippi River. Mr. Ron Watson, Chief, Environmental Division (NGB), noted that the EPA was going to begin regulating mobile sources of environmental impact. In addition, the FAA was beginning to take a dim view of military presence in congested areas. Both did not bode well for ANG flying operations and available airspace.[75]

(U) The ANG took a proactive stance in dealing with airspace concerns. The ANG reorganized the manner in which airspace was acquired, controlled and managed. Committees were formed in each FAA region with user-driven committees from the field (Operations and Public Affairs) included to deal with local issues. Stress was laid on dealing with the public and addressing their concerns.

(U) The ANG also tried to communicate with all users in a region. All military services were invited to be a part of the effort. Because of the ANG's willingness to listen to all sides and be flexible, it developed an advantage over the Air Force which by nature was more intransigent.* One positive result from this approach was that Buckley Field was able to tap into FAA's radar coverage, extending into southern Colorado. This allowed for military control in the tracking of ANG aircraft in that area.[76]

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* (U) Mr. Jack Kier, chief of the Airspace Branch at the ANGRC, reported that the ANG's Air Force counterparts were not very comfortable in dealing with the public. In fact, he noted there was a certain amount of admiration on the part of some Air Force officers for the effectiveness of the ANG's community relations with respect to airspace managment.

(U) In August 1988 the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report on airspace use citing the need for the FAA to improve its management of special use airspace (SUA). The GAO noted between 1978 and 1987 SUA increased in square mileage by 22 percent and in the number of areas by 40 percent. The primary users of SUA were the military. As a response to this increase, Congress enacted the "Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987." It required the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense to "jointly conduct a national review of the need and utilization of special use airspace with a view to determining its impact on civil aviation operations and on the quality of the environment."

(U) A joint working group on the congressionally mandated national review held its initial meeting in April 1988. The GAO charged the FAA did not have sufficient data to manage SUA and did not provide adequate usage guidance to its regions. That report was part of the reason the FAA began to take a harder look at congested areas such as Los Angeles. The ANGSC Airspace Branch (CEVA) pointed out that if the DOD could not effectively manage its SUA, the FAA would do it for them.[77]

(U) The GAO report generated concern among ANG leaders that perhaps not enough was being done to guarantee adequate airspace in the future. In 1989, the ANG began development of a long range master plan that was to track airspace requirements into the year 2000. The initial results were disappointing, even though there was involvement of all appropriate agencies. The major areas of concern were the

lack of sufficient full-time expertise at the state and unit level, and the need for more senior leadership to provide policy, guidance and interstate solutions.

(U) The planning approach changed to include both a senior-level Airspace Steering Committee and an airspace managers working group. There was emphasis on a proactive approach, substantiated requirements and thorough, early coordination. By November 1990, two regional airspace planning committees were up and running (Eastern-New England and Central-Great Lakes). A third region (Southwest) had its initial meeting that month.[78]

(U) A formal document on long-range airspace planning was published in January 1992. It presented a summary of airspace planning activity between March and December, 1991. It documented regional progress, delineated the planning process and raised planning issues, such as to what extent should the ANG get involved in the use, development and refinement of automated and centralized scheduling and reporting systems for airspace and ranges.

(U) A particularly noteworthy part of the report detailed the "Eastern-New England Airspace Plan." The plan developed parallel to the Northeast regional EIS process which addressed the changing utilization of the current airspace due to ANG flying unit equipment changes. The EIS was driven by training airspace shortfalls identified by the Airspace Planning Committee and by the planned conversion of the 103rd TFG and the 104th TFG from A-10s to F-16s in early FY 1993. In addition, the 108th TFW, McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and the 112th TFG, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

converted from fighters to KC-135s in October 1991.

(U) The completed and planned conversions of ANG flying units from A-10s to F-16s generated the need for more airspace for air-to-air training. The only low altitude overland air-to-air training area that had been assessed for F-16 operations was the Syracuse military operations area (MOA). The size of that area limited air-to-air tactics options and realism.

(U) The Airspace Planning Committee, working closely with unit airspace and operations managers and the ANG Airspace Management Branch, developed six airspace proposals to be considered in the EIS. The proposals described the following MOAs:*

1. New "Great State of Maine". Extending from 100 feet above ground level (AGL) to 5,500 feet mean sea level (MSL), this MOA would lie below the existing low altitude airways. It would provide needed airspace for low altitude overland training, reduce the level of activity in other low altitude training airspace and reduce the dependence on overwater training areas that are more hazardous during cold weather months.

* See Illustration IV-1 which follows.

Illustration IV-1 (U)

Eastern and New England Region Training Airspace Proposal[*]

[*] SOURCE: Plan (U), NGB/RD, "Air National Guard Long Range Airspace Planning," Jan 92, Figure III-3.

2. Lower Floor of Condor 1. This modification would lower the floor of the Condor 1 MOA to 300 feet AGL from 7,000 feet MSL, providing more of the same benefits cited for the "Great State of Maine" MOA. The Condor 2 MOA would not be affected.

3. Expand Syracuse 1 into Syracuse 5 & 6. The Syracuse 5 MOA would extend east from the Syracuse 1 MOA, with altitude limits from 2,000 feet AGL to 6,000 feet MSL. The Syracuse 6 MOA would extend to east and south of the Syracuse 1 MOA, with a floor of 2,000 feet AGL and a ceiling of 10,000 feet MSL. The 2,000 feet AGL floor of Syracuse 5 & 6 was to mitigate impacts on wilderness areas. The expanded area would underlie the Falcon MOAs. The created airspace would permit realistic low altitude tactical training in the F-16.

4. New Antler. Overlying portions of existent military training routes with floors as low as 100 feet AGL, the proposed Antler MOA would provide an area for low altitude air-to-air training (LOWAT) scenarios, which in turn, would benefit aircraft ingressing or egressing the Fort Indiantown Gap air-to-surface weapons range.

5. Expand Yankee. Expanding the medium altitude (9,000 feet MSL to 18,000 feet MSL) Yankee 1 MOA and the low altitude (100 feet AGL to 9,000 feet MSL) Yankee 2 MOA would provide yet another suitable low and medium altitude training area for fighter units in the region.

6. Add Segments to VR-1709. New overwater segments were to provide for more training scenarios because they

would traverse W-107. A new north entry point would enhance access by northern-based units. Widening some of the existent legs would disperse aircraft noise and provide more realistic tactical entry to Warren Grove air-to-surface weapons range.[79]

(U) As mentioned earlier, the long-range planning paralled the EIS study for the northeast U.S. The NEPA prohibited the National Guard or any other governmental agency from spending public funds on anything which could potentially impact on the environment without first conducting detailed environmental studies. The northeast EIS was started to determine how disruptive F-16 aircraft might be. The study was expected to serve as a model for future proposed ANG training locations. Stemming from Connecticut and Massachusetts F-16 conversions, there was considerable public input into the discussions.

(U) Seven meetings were held in six states during July 1991 to identify significant issues related to the changes in military training airspace. Additional meetings were held in November and December. Over 400 people attended the nine meetings with 105 making verbal presentations. The NGB received 146 written comments. Key conversion issues were noise and its associated ramifications along with residential encroachment and potential economic impact. Key training airspace issues included airspace management, safety of flight, and fire and crash response. Specifically addressed were violations involving existing airport control zones and then current training airspace boundaries. In more remote geographic regions there was concern about impacts on general aviation in areas having little or no low level air traffic

control radar coverage and poor radio communications.

(U) Socioeconomic issues were paramount in Maine. They included considerations of public acceptance and potential impacts on quality of life in the region, as well as concerns about economic impacts on the tourist industry. For example, Maine citizens were upset with the low level flights over the western part of their state. At a September 1991 meeting, residents expressed frustration with the complex regulations governing low level flights. The ANG had proposed increasing the number of flights to 4,670 per year, while expanding the allowable area of those flights consistent with the proposed Maine MOA.

(U) By the end of January 1992, the NGB was to submit a draft EIS to the EPA, numerous federal, state and local agencies and to the public. Comments generated from that draft were to be used in preparing a final EIS.[80]

(U) The general feeling among ANG environmental leaders and airspace managers was the Air Guard was out front on the airspace use issue. By the end of 1991, the ANG was already beginning to see positive results in the approval for additional airspace.[81]

Environmental Public Affairs

(U) With the growth of environmental laws and community relations requirements, ANG units realized they had an obligation to conduct community relations efforts. Because of the immensity of the task, in 1988 the ANG environmental Public Affairs function was created. That also was the

result of an integrated approach to environmental issues. Public Affairs worked side by side with the technical side of the house. The Adjutant Generals and unit commanders discovered quickly they needed appropriate public affairs support and needed to respond to questions from the press and community.

(U) A major achievement was the initiation of a "Risk Communication" course planned in conjunction with a private firm and a Columbia University professor. The course lasted three days and trained public affairs officers (PAOs), pilots, and command staff to communicate with the public about environmental concerns. The major components of the course included knowing the public, communication tools, answering the tough questions and presentation strategy. Initially, the NGB environmental staff was trained, followed by regional training in the continental United States (CONUS). The Department of Energy copied the course for their personnel.

(U) Though the ANG had some success in creating an environmental public affairs staff, it found itself out of compliance in the community relations requirements of many environmental programs. With limited public affairs staff in the states, the NGB attempted to contract out for services at a cost of $1.5 million annually. Unfortunately, the Bureau's chief of legal contracting did not approve of it. Though there was hope the ruling would eventually be overturned, the environmental public affairs staff lost a year of valuable time. In the interim, the community relations aspect of compliance was not enforced.[82]

Environmental Compliance

(U) During the early 1980s, several laws were passed which dictated tracking of environmental compliance. The most significant legislation included the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).

(U) The clean air and clean water laws were named for the media they regulated. The RCRA primarily covered the handling, storage and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous waste. The TSCA targeted specific chemicals, such as PCBs and asbestos. The latter were the major compliance laws, but the National Guard had to comply with a myriad of other federal, state and local laws.[83]

(U) In order to ensure that the ANG was in full compliance with all of such laws and regulations, the Air Directorate instituted the Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management program (ECAMP). One of its objectives was to assure the NGB, installation commanders, and environmental staff that their environmental programs were effectively addressing those problems that could: significantly degrade the environment; expose the ANG and its people to avoidable financial liabilities as a result of noncompliance; erode public confidence in the ANG and the defense establishment; and expose individuals to civil and criminal liability.

(U) Also, ECAMP was to assist commanders in anticipating and preventing environmental problems. It sought to establish a system for environmental compliance

management and to provide data for use in identifying, programming and budgeting environmental requirements. Finally, it aimed to provide accurate and complete information to the public on the status of installation environmental compliance programs.[84]

(U) The ECAMP helped reduce the number of environmental violations in the field. General Conaway implemented a two and a half day course for TAGs which further assisted in reorienting thinking on environmental matters. Because the EPA was steadily turning over more authority to the states, the liklihood of state inspectors showing up on ANG installations increased. To insure environmental compliance actions were taken care of, positions for environmental coordinators at 87 units were validated and included in the FY 1992 POM process.

(U) Fortunately, most compliance violations were 70 to 80 percent administrative and easy to fix. However, funding shortfalls made other compliance problems more difficult to take care of. In February 1991, four major areas were underfunded: removal of underground fuel storage tanks (USTs); upgrade of hydrant refueling systems; fire training pit replacement; and asbestos removal. Of even greater concern, such shortfalls were projected to increase through FY 1996.[85]

Summary and Conclusions

(U) In the area of military construction, property acquisition, long range planning and envrionmental cleanup,

the Air Guard preceded at an hectic pace. This was not surprising in view of the accelerated conversion of aircraft and the increase in missions assigned to the ANG by the Air Force. On the surface, as with aircraft logistics, the ANG gave the impression of moving steadily into full partnership with the USAF. Unfortunately, the true picture was not so rosy.

(U) As with aircraft procurement and maintenance, the ANG faced shortfalls in their MILCON and RPM budgets. If it was not bad enough that the normal long lead times associated with MILCON was not responsive to the changes occurring in the 1980s, congressional add-ons caused more problems than they solved. Such additions to the budget provoked the USAF to cut funds in subsequent defense budgets. Consequently, O&M and RPM funds had to be shuffled to fill the gaps. The DOD also exercised special controls over MILCON and land acquisition beginning in January 1990. Its position was to strike a balanced approach with MILCON requirements between active and Reserve components of the Armed Forces. The end result was that ANG facilities construction and upgrade programs did not keep pace with established requirements.[86]

(U) Fortunately, the MILCON shortfalls ($1.5 billion in FY 1991) did not impair readiness. The ANG made good use of the new facilities it did complete. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) felt that the shortfalls were not all bad. It advised against a massive infusion of construction dollars since changes in pending force structure and mix, end strength and base structure could lead to a reduction in requirements. The Board noted some Reserve units could be eliminated, presenting the opportunity to consolidate or move

from leased facilities.

(U) The ANG tried to stay ahead of the game through its emphasis on base master plans. That was in line with the RFPB's suggestion that Reserve organizations review and validate their facilities funding strategy. Base master plans allowed for flexibility in light of unexpected conversions, base closures and relocations, along with changes in mission.

(U) It was in the area of environmental programs, however, that the ANG clearly exhibited its ability to manage problems. By FY 1991, the ANG was conducting nine different environmental training courses for its leaders at all levels. The Environmental Communications training course was particularly successful and attracted interest from other federal agencies.

(U) An environmental public affairs team was established at the Bureau and a special team was sent to Otis ANGB in Massachusetts to deal with public concerns and the IRP. While replacement of underground storage tanks was the most pressing and expensive of compliance issues, ECAMP directed unit commanders to be on top of other compliance requirements.[87]

(U) The ANG was also out front on airspace management, fostering the concept of regional airspace planning. No matter what the environmental issue, however, the ANG kept the public informed. Many town meetings were held to hear concerns and explain ANG proposals. Aircraft conversions drove proposed increases in ranges, e.g. While such openness

did not solve all conflicts, the ANG discovered it was better to share information with local communities. In this respect it had an advantage over the USAF.

(U) By the end of CY 1991, however, funding for future environmental programs was a question mark. The ANG could not predict the extent to which Congress would continue to support installation restoration. Commanders who delayed addressing their environmental problems were in danger of finding less than adequate funding.[88]

NOTES

1. For general background information on facilities, base closures and real property, see the annual reports of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington, D.C.

2. A copy of all base master plans is kept by the Program Development Branch, Plans & Programs Division, Engineering & Services, Air National Guard Readiness Center.

3. See Docs 34, 40, and 48.

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10. Rprt (U), NGB, "Annual Report for the Chief, National Guard Bureau," 1988, p. 79.

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16. Point Paper (U), Mr. Ralph Conte, NGB/DEP, "Drastic Reduction to the ANG MILCON Program," 13 Dec 90, **SD IV-12**.

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18. Fact Sheet (U), n.a., "FY 1992 Military Construction Program," n.d., **SD IV-14**.

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21. Hist (U), 130th TAG, 1 Jan-31 Dec 90, p. 5.

22. Hist (U), 182nd TASG, 1 Jan-31 Mar 85, p. 1.

23. *Ibid*, Doc 4.

24. Hist (U), 182nd TASG, 1 Jul-31 Oct 85, p. 1.

25. Article (U), Terry L. Towery, "National Guard Complex Gets OK," Peoria Journal Star, 14 Sep 85, p. A-3; Hist (U), 182nd TASG, 1 Apr-30 Jun 87, p. 1; Hist (U), 182nd TASG, 1 Jan-30 Jun 88, p. 1; Hist (U), 182nd TASG, 1 Jul-31 Dec 89, pp. 7-8.

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29. *Ibid*, pp. v-viii.

30. *Ibid*, p. 5-43.

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33. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, 1991, pp. 5-21 - 5-22; Article (U), Cathie Calvert and Nick Anderson, "Moffett on Hit List," San Jose Mercury News, 26 Jan 90, p. 1A & 20A, **SD IV-24**.

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